Mobile network download speeds declined by more than 50%, while Starlink usage experienced a nearly 200% increase compared to pre-storm baselines
Less than a year after the April 2025 Iberian Peninsula blackout exposed deep vulnerabilities in Portugal’s telecom infrastructure, the country faced another severe test. Between late January and early February 2026, a rapid succession of powerful extratropical cyclones battered the country, knocking out power to over a million customers, disrupting mobile connectivity for hundreds of thousands, and triggering a dramatic spike in satellite broadband usage. Speedtest Intelligence® data captures the scale of network impact and the emerging role of low-earth orbit (LEO) satellite connectivity as a layer of redundancy when terrestrial networks falter.
Key Takeaways:
- Median mobile download speeds in Portugal fell by as much as 52.4% from their pre-storm baseline, dropping from 107.3 Mbps to just 51.1 Mbps at their lowest point on February 8, as successive storms compounded network strain.
- Mobile upload speeds declined by up to 46.6%, while latency increased by 15.6% and jitter by 27.1% during the worst of the disruption, reflecting significant network congestion and infrastructure stress.
- Starlink user activity in Portugal surged by approximately 196% above pre-storm levels at its peak on February 12, with elevated adoption persisting well into late February even as mobile networks began to stabilize.
- The data highlights a clear network substitution pattern, with Starlink activity climbing in near-lockstep with mobile speed declines and fixed network disruptions, reinforcing the case for satellite as a meaningful resilience layer during prolonged terrestrial outages.
- Portugal, like many European countries outside the Nordics, continues to lack any binding requirements for specific minimum backup power levels at mobile sites. Recent policy developments in Switzerland and in the EU’s Digital Networks Act (DNA) suggest resilience planning is moving from concept to practical action.
A devastating storm sequence
Storm Kristin made landfall in Portugal’s Leiria district on the night of January 28, 2026, bringing record-breaking winds of over 200 km/h in the Coimbra region and generating over 1,500 emergency incidents in a single night. The storm was the most destructive to hit the country in recent memory, surpassing wind speed records previously held by Hurricane Leslie. Initial disruption was severe, with Reuters reporting more than 3,000 weather-related incidents and electricity distributor E-REDES indicating that outage levels had earlier reached 855,000 customers before restoration work began to reduce that figure.
On the grid side, the damage split across transmission and distribution layers. REN reported 61 very high-voltage pylons knocked down during Storm Kristin and 774 km of very high-voltage lines out of operation, which it said was equivalent to about 7% of Portugal’s transmission grid. E-REDES separately reported more than 600 damaged medium-voltage poles and said that more than one million customers had been left without power at one stage of the event. This distinction is significant because it highlights how resilience bottlenecks emerge across multiple network tiers, not only at the local distribution level.
Telecom disruption was also prolonged. Paulo Fernandes (head of the Central Region Reconstruction Mission Structure) said the affected area started with 307,900 mobile and landline users without communications on 30 January, and that nearly 84,000 customers in the central region still lacked communications almost three weeks later. He also said around 40% of cases were linked to the restoration of electricity supply to mobile sites.
This power dependency aligns with local expert commentary. INESC TEC-linked analysis highlighted that many telecom outages were driven first by loss of electricity at network sites, with a share of the remainder linked to infrastructure faults such as fiber breaks. It was also reported that ANACOM had recommended activation of national roaming, which could help by allowing users to attach to alternative networks where available.
Mobile network performance degradation was severe and sustained, with recovery still ongoing
Analysis of Speedtest Intelligence data paints a detailed picture of how Portugal’s mobile networks responded to the storm sequence. To assess the impact, we established a pre-storm performance baseline using daily median values from January 3 through January 27, 2026, then measured deviations across three distinct phases of disruption.
Prior to the storms, Portugal’s mobile networks were delivering a median download speed of 107.3 Mbps and median upload speed of 15.7 Mbps, with a multi-server latency of 33.5 ms. These figures are consistent with a well-performing mobile market (ranking in the top 30 globally in the latest iteration of the Speedtest Global Index).

The onset of Storm Kristin on January 28 triggered an immediate and sharp decline. Median download speeds fell to 64.5 Mbps that day, a 39.9% drop from baseline, while upload speeds declined 37.4% to 9.8 Mbps. Latency spiked 15.6% to 39 ms and jitter surged 27.1% to 10 ms, indicating significant network congestion as damaged infrastructure concentrated traffic on surviving cells (likely compounded by the loss of fixed connectivity in homes driving more traffic onto the depleted mobile grid).
Rather than recovering, network performance continued to deteriorate in the days that followed as Storms Leonardo and Marta exacerbated the damage. During the sustained disruption phase from February 1 through 14, average median download speeds fell to 59.9 Mbps, a 44.1% decline from baseline. The single worst day came on February 8, during Storm Marta, when median download speeds bottomed out at just 51.1 Mbps, a 52.4% decline. Upload speeds during this phase averaged just 9.5 Mbps, down 39.1% from baseline.

Latency and jitter, often overlooked but critical indicators of quality of experience (QoE) in interactive applications like video conferencing, told a similar story. Median latency during the sustained phase rose to 37 ms, a 10.5% increase over baseline, while jitter averaged 9 ms, up 21.6%. Elevated jitter in particular can reflect the instability characteristic of a network under duress, where routing paths shift unpredictably as infrastructure comes on and offline.
By mid-to-late February, partial recovery was underway. Median download speeds during the February 15 through February 23 period rose to 69.8 Mbps, still 34.9% below baseline but representing meaningful improvement. Upload speeds recovered to 11.0 Mbps (down 29.7%), while latency moderated to 36 ms (up 8.3%). Notably, jitter remained stubbornly elevated at 9 ms (up 21.6%), suggesting that while raw throughput was improving, network stability had not yet fully normalized.
Starlink as a Resilience Layer
As mobile network performance declined, Speedtest data reveals a striking and sustained surge in Starlink usage across Portugal, providing one of the clearest real-world illustrations of satellite connectivity functioning as a resilience layer during prolonged terrestrial disruption.

In the weeks before Storm Kristin, Starlink activity in Portugal was relatively stable. From January 28 onward, however, user activity began climbing sharply. During the acute phase from January 28 through January 31, Starlink user activity averaged 49.4% above baseline, peaking at 61.3% above on January 31 as the scale of mobile network disruption became apparent. This initial surge likely reflects both existing Starlink subscribers increasing their usage in response to degraded mobile and fixed service and new users activating service for the first time.
The sustained disruption phase from February 1 through February 14 saw Starlink activity more than double, averaging 118.4% above baseline. The single highest day came on February 12, when user activity reached approximately 196% above pre-storm levels. This coincided with the period of deepest mobile network degradation (and, likely, fixed network unavailability either due to localized power loss or line faults), providing strong evidence of a network substitution dynamic where some users turned to satellite connectivity as their primary or sole means of internet access.

Perhaps most notably, Starlink user activity did not recede even as mobile networks began their partial recovery. During the February 15 through February 23 period, Starlink activity averaged 151.0% above baseline, substantially higher than even the acute storm phase. This pattern suggests that for many users, the storm experience catalyzed a longer-term shift in connectivity behavior, with satellite maintained as either a primary or backup connection even after terrestrial alternatives began stabilizing.
Portuguese authorities also actively deployed Starlink as an emergency communications tool. Starlink equipment was distributed to remote areas where traditional telecommunications had been knocked offline, helping to bridge the connectivity gap in the hardest-hit communities. This mirrors the pattern observed during the April 2025 Iberian blackout, when Starlink remained operational across the peninsula by routing through ground stations in Italy as Spanish facilities went dark.
It is worth noting that Starlink speeds did moderate as user load increased. Average download speeds during the sustained phase fell to 163.5 Mbps, a 21.7% decline from the pre-storm Starlink baseline of 208.8 Mbps. However, even at their most congested, Starlink speeds remained materially higher than the degraded mobile network’s performance during the same period, delivering nearly three times the median download speed that mobile users were experiencing.
The Regulatory Gap and the Road to Resilience
The storm sequence reinforces a core resilience lesson: in prolonged extreme-weather events, telecom continuity is heavily shaped by power autonomy at sites, restoration logistics, and transport network redundancy, not only by RAN capacity. In practice, the biggest outages often reflect cross-sector interdependence between electricity, fibre transport and mobile access infrastructure.
Indeed, domestically, the storms have reignited debate around the resilience of Portugal’s telecom infrastructure, particularly the adequacy of backup power provisions at mobile sites. The finding that 40% of failures stemmed from power loss at mobile sites, rather than direct storm damage, points to a structural vulnerability that is within regulatory reach to address.
Portugal currently lacks binding requirements for specific minimum backup power autonomy levels at mobile sites. This stands in contrast to Nordic markets such as Norway and Finland, where regulators require between two and six hours of backup power at critical sites, alongside routine stress testing and contingency planning obligations.
In Norway, Nkom’s forsterket ekom programme is a state-backed resilience scheme that hardens selected sites in priority municipalities. Designated mobile sites must have at least 72 hours of backup power, the main transmission path must also have 72 hours, and a separate reserve transmission path is required. Switzerland has also recently codified a phased minimum backup approach. In January 2026, the Federal Council adopted an FDV revision requiring mobile operators to install emergency power at key sites and antennas so mobile service can be maintained for at least four hours from 2031 (with emergency calls covered first, and other services phased in later).
Within the EU, meanwhile, Brussels’ Electronic Communications Code (EECC) permits member states to mandate such provisions but does not require them. The Commission’s DNA proposal, adopted on 21 January 2026, is framed around investment and simplification, but it also directly elevates resilience by introducing an EU-level Preparedness Plan to address rising risks from natural disasters and foreign interference, and by embedding security and resilience criteria into the pan-EU satellite mechanism.
The resilience policy implications arising from this are important. The DNA gives the EU a stronger coordination spine for preparedness, but it does not remove the need for national regulators to set concrete, site-level resilience expectations (including backup-power minimums) that reflect local grid conditions and risk exposure.
On the operator side, Vodafone’s Enhanced Power initiative, launched in November 2025 with Portugal as a first deployment region, targets 10,000-plus mobile infrastructure sites across Europe with backup power provisions ranging from four hours at critical access sites to 72 hours at core mobile data centers. The initiative incorporates AI-based systems to predict and conserve backup power duration. Separately, Portugal’s government has announced a €400 (US$ 471) million investment package for grid resilience, including a 750 MW battery storage expansion.
The experience of January and February 2026 reinforces what the Storm Éowyn analysis across the UK and Ireland also demonstrated: that the resilience of mobile networks in extreme weather is fundamentally a function of power autonomy at mobile sites. Where terrestrial infrastructure falls short, satellite connectivity is increasingly proving its value, not as a replacement for mobile networks, but as a complementary layer of redundancy that can sustain connectivity when ground-based systems falter.
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